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FELONY MURDER IN NEW YORK
THOMAS L. J. CORCORANt

STATUTES, usually the least lively of all legal topics, are sometimes
the source of the most spirited and stimulating discussions. The
drama latent in almost every sentence of the penal statutes dealing with
homicide, appeals to the interest of the layman as well as of the lawyer,
and some of the most fascinating and discursive questions in the entire
field of criminal law have their source in these statutes. This latter
observation is particularly true of Section 1044 of the New York Penal
Law which defines felony murder, as it is frequently called. It reads, in
pertinent part, as follows:
MuRDER IN FIRST DEGREE DEFINED. The killing of a human being, unless it
is excusable or justifiable, is murder in the first degree, when committed...
2. By an act imminently dangerous to others, and evincing a depraved mind,
regardless of human life, although without a premeditated design to effect the
death of any individual; or without a design to effect death, by a person engaged in the comninission of, or in an attempt to commit a felony, cither upon or
affecting the person killed or otherwise; or,
3. When perpetrated in committing the crime of arson in the first degree .... 1

Provisions defining the crime of felony murder are to be found in the
statutes of almost every jurisdiction in the United States, " but it is
principally to the New York doctrine of felony murder that these pages
shall be devoted. The common law history of the rule and its ramifications in other jurisdictions will be examined and considered only insofar
as they may prove helpful to a proper understanding of the law in this
state and of such changes in it as may be herein proposed. But before
attempting an analysis of the statute, it might be well to have a brief
glimpse at the birth and early development of the doctrine of felony
murder at common law.
The common law definition of murder is the unlawful killing of any
reasonable creature, in being, with malice aforethought either express
or implied.2 It was malice aforethought, or prepense, which, according
' Lecturer in Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
1. Italics supplied.
la. These statutes vary, of course. Some are worded substantially the same as the
New York provision, others provide that homicide during certain named felonies constitutes felony murder, and in still others, a felony murder is not of the first degree. For
an exhaustive list of felony murder statutes see Arent and MacDonald, The Felony
Murder Doctrine and Its Application Under the New York Statutes (1935) 20 Corer.
L. Q. 288.
2. See Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mlass. 295, 304 et seq. (1850); 3 Coun, I.sT.
47; 4 BL. CoMM. *195; 1 HALE P. C. 451; 1 EAST P. C. 214; SSE.
unI, DicEsr or T=
Can=AL LAW (1904) 182; 1 WHARTox, CR=AL LAw (12th ed. 1932) § 419.
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to Blackstone, was the "grand criterion" 3 used to distinguish murder
from manslaughter. But the ordinary meaning of malice aforethought
is not always the same as its legal sense.4 Ill will, hatred or revenge is
the layman's concept of malice and, while it is true that these conditions
of mind also constitute malice in the eyes of the law, they are by no
means essential to the legal concept of the word.' The father who
killed his infant child to save him from anticipated suffering and unhappiness 6 or because, in mistaken religious zeal, he desired to send him
to a happier abode,' was guilty of murder at common law, although
moved to action by love for his boy. Nor were premeditation and deliberation, as those terms are understood today, essential to the concept
of malice aforethought. No interval of time was necessary between
the formation of the intent to kill and the homicide; the malice was
aforethought even though the homicidal design was conceived instantaneously with the killing.8 Express or actual malice aforethought
therefore, existed at common law when, in the absence of excuse,
justification or provocation,9 a homicide was intentionally committed
3. 4 BL. COMM. *198.
4. 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, -HsToRy OF ENGLisr LAW (2nd ed. 1923) 469. For an
excellent and comprehensive treatment of malice aforethought, see Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought (1934) 43 YAL. L. J. 537. See also Brown, Coustractivc
Murder and Felonious Intent (1909) 34 LAw MAC. & Rav. 453; Maitland, The Early
History of Malice Aforethought (1883) 8 LAw MAO. & REv. 406; Constructive Murder
(1929) 67 L. J. 450; Comment (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 528; Some Pboints on the Law of
Murder (1903) 67 JusTicE or PEACE 530-531; Notes (1912) 38 L. R. A. (N.s.) 1054.
5. State v. Johns, 6 Pen. 174, 65 AtI. 763 (Del. 1906); State v. Ehlers, 98 N. J. L.
236, 119 Aft. 15 (1922); People v. Kirby, 2 Park. Crim. Rep. 28 (N. Y. 1823).
"Though the words, in their ordinary sense, conveyed the idea of deadly animosity
against the deceased, and, by a strict interpretation, would, perhaps, only embrace cases
of a killing from motives of revenge, they were not so limited by the construction of
the courts. All homicides, for which no excuse or palliation was proved, and a large
class where there was no actual intention to effect the death of the person killed, were
held to be murder. To justify these convictions, an artificial meaning was attached to
the words malice prepense, by which they were made to qualify the taking of human
life, in all cases where sound policy, or the demerits of the offender were supposed to require that he should be capitally convicted." Darry v. People, 10 N. Y. 120, 150 (1854).
See Bromage v. Prosser, 4 Barn. & Cres. 247, 255, 107 Eng. Reprints 1051, 1054 (1825).
6. State v. Ehlers, 98 N. J. L. 236, 119 AtI. 15 (1922).
7. People v. Kirby, 2 Park. Crim. Rep. 28 (N. Y. 1823).
8. Allen v. United States, 164 U. S. 492 (1896); State v. Heidelberg, 120 La. 300,
45 So. 256 (1908); State v. Abbott, 64 W. Va. 411, 62 S. E. 693 (1908). See Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. 295, 306 (1850). Of course, under a statute in which deliberation and premeditation are specifically required, such as N. Y. PENAL LAW (1909)
§ 1044 (1), the intent to kill must have existed for some period before the slaying and It
cannot take place in a fraction of a second or at the moment of striking the fatal blow.
People v. Jackson, 196 N. Y. 357, 1909); People v. Guadagnino, 233 N. Y. 344 (1922).
9. Provocation sufficient to arouse a reasonable man to a heat of passion reduced the
crime from murder to manslaughter. Regina v. Rothwell, 12 Cox C. C. 145 (1871).
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though the slayer had not formed the intention until the moment of
striking the fatal blow and even though he was actuated by the kindliest
feelings towards his victim."0 But the use of the term "implied malice
aforethought" by the common law courts was even more misleading. It
was applied not merely to cases in which the existence of an intent to
kill, and therefore malice, could be inferred from the nature of the
defendant's conduct, (e.g., where he performed an act evincing a depraved mind, heedless of the lives of others") but the term was also
applied to cases where the homicide was unintentional but was committed
during the perpetration of some collateral felony.'
There were, in all, four cases at common law in which the defendant
could be found guilty of murder of malice prepense for a killing which
was neither excusable nor justifiable." These four cases were:
(a) When there existed an intention on his part to cause death or
serious bodily injury either to the person killed14 or to another " and
there was not sufficient provocation to reduce the crime to manslaughter.
(b) When there was knowledge on his part that his actions would
probably cause death or serious bodily injury either to the person killed
or to another, even in the absence of a specific intent to kill.'0
(c) When the defendant was, at the time, opposing an officer of the
law in the performance of his duties.'
10. See notes 5, 6, 7 and 8, supra.
11. Mayes v. People, 106 Ill. 306 (1883); Brown v. Commonwealth, 13 Ky. 372, 17
S. W. 220 (1891); Davis v. State, 106 Tex. Cr. App. 165, 292 S. W. 220 (1927); Rex. v.
Holloway, Croke Car. 131, 79 Eng. Reprints 715 (1628). For cases construing a statutory
enactment similar to the common law rule of responsibility for murder where defendant
performs an act evincing a depraved mind, see People v. Jernatow-ski, 238 N. Y. 188,
144 N. E. 497 (1924); Darry v. People, 10 N. Y. 120 (1854). Note that whereas the
common law rule apparently required merely that the act be inherently dangerous to
another, the N. Y. PENAL LAw (1909) § 1044 (2) (p. 43 of the text) says dangerous to
"others," and Darry v. People held that merely endangering the life of one other Irson
was not murder under such a provision.
12. Regina v. Lee, 4 Fost & F. 63, 176 Eng. Reprints 46S (1864); Queen v. Franz,
2 Fost & F. 580, 175 Eng. Reprints 1195 (1861); Regina v. Greenwood, 7 Cox C. C.
404 (1857); 4 BL. Comamr *200.
13. 3 SmPBxi, HiSTORY or Tim CpmA,
LAw or E:GL,
(1883) 22; Sin'rna,
DIGEsT or CRu=AL LAw (6th ed. 1904) 182.
14. Grey's Case, Kelyng 64, 84 Eng. Reprints 1084 (1666); Regina v. Welsh, 11 Cox
C. C. 336 (1869).
15. State v. Smith, 2 Strobhart's Law 77 (S. C. 1847) ; Gore's Case, 9 Coke 81a, 77 Eng.

Reprints 853 (1611).
16. See note 11, supra.
17. Yong's Case, 4 Coke 40a, 76 Eng. Reprints 984 (1587); Rex v. Porter, 12 Cox C.
C. 444. But the defendant must have known that the deceased was an officer, or a private
individual with lawful warrant. Rex v. Tomson, Kelyng 66 (166-). "As if a magistrate or known officer, or any other that hath lawful warrant, and in doing, offering to
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(d) When the accused was, at the time, engaged in the commission
of a felony."8
It was from the last subdivision, of course, that our modern law of
felony muirder came. The rule may be traced back to two early authorities: the first, a statement in Coke that if A assaults B to rob him, and
during the assault A kills B, "... this is murder by malice implied...,,9
and the second, an early English case 20 in which the majority of the court
concluded that murder was committed when an innocent bystander was
accidently shot by a member of a mob attempting to commit robbery. No
intent to kill was necessary in common law felony murder,21 nor is it today
under the New York statute,2 2 for the general criminal intent evidenced
by the accused in committing a felony is transferred, by implication, to
the homicide committed so as to make the latter a homicide of malice
prepense. 3 This transposition of intent from the felony to the homicide
has resulted in the rule that a conviction on the theory of felony murder
is consistent with an indictment which charges murder in the common
law form, to wit, "of malice aforethought," and does not specifically
mention felony murder.2 4
Necessity of an Underlying Felony-Merger
The question which naturally presents itself at the outset of a discussion of the New York statute is whether all felonies are included
within its scope. The killing of a human being during the commission
of the felonies of robbery25 and burglary 26 is clearly within the language
do his office, or to execute his warrant, is slain, this is murder by malice implied hn
law." 3 CoKE, INST. 52.
18. See note 12, supra.
19. 3 COKE, INsT. 52.
20. Mansell & Herbert's Case, 2 Dyer 128 B, 73 Eng. Reprints 279 (1536).
21. See note 12, supra.
22. People v. Giusto, 206 N. Y. 67, 99 N. E. 190 (1912). People v. Udwin, 254 N. Y.
255, 172 N. E. 489 (1930).
23. See People v. Enoch, 13 Wend. 159, 174 (N. Y. 1834).
24. People v. Giblin, 115 N. Y. 196, 21 N. E. 1062 (1889); People v. Sullivan, 173
N. Y. 122, 65 N. E. 989 (1903); People v. Flanigan, 174 N. Y. 356, 66 N. E. 988 (1903);
People v. Nichols, 230 N. Y. 221, 129 N. E. 883 (1921); See People v. Osmond, 138 N. Y.
80, 84, 33 N. E. 739, 740 (1893) (to the effect that the common law form of indictment
was proper for any kind of statutory murder).
25. People v. Wise, 163 N. Y. 440, 57 N. E. 740 (1900); People v. Monat, 200 N. Y.
308, 93 N. E. 982 (1911); People v. Madas, 201 N. Y. 349, 94 N. E. 857 (1911);
People v. Martone, 256 N. Y. 395, 176 N. E. 544 (1931).
26. People v. McGloin, 91 N. Y. 241 (1883); People v. Greenwall, 115 N. Y. 520,
22 N. E. 180 (1889); People v. Meyer, 162 N. Y. 357, 56 N. E. 758 (1900) (burglary In
third degree by breaking out of a building); People v. Schlelman, 197 N. Y. 383, 90 N. E.
950 (1910); People v. Chapman, 224 N. Y. 463, 121 N. E. 381 (1918).
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and spirit of the statute, but does the statute go so far as to constitute
an accidental homicide during the commission of any felony, regardless
of its nature, murder in the first degree? While a casual reading of the
statute might lead one to believe that the answer is conclusively in the
affirmative, a more careful examination of this section and of the associate sections on homicide will reveal that this cannot be its meaning.
The most usual case covered by the literal wording of the statute and
yet clearly not within its scope is the commission of a felonious assault
which culminates in the death of the victim.2 7 If A, for example, dissaults B with a dangerous weapon intending to kill him, but without
deliberation and premeditation, A is committing assault in the first
degree, vhich is a felony.28 If B were to die as a result of this assault,
however, A would not be guilty of felony murder for the assault he
committed is said to be merged in the homicide and in order to constitute a felony murder there must exist a felony separate and distinct
from the homicide itself."9 Although this theory of merger now seems
fairly well imbedded in the doctrine of felony murder, such was not
always the case.3 0 There was a good deal of confusion in some of the
earlier New York cases 3 ' resulting probably from the absence of common law authority on the point, since a felonious assault resulting in
death was, in the absence of provocation,32- murder at common lavrP
and there was no reason, therefore, for the courts at that time to decide
whether such assault would support a felony murder charge. Unless
the distinction was recognized by the New York courts, however, other
sections of the Penal Law dealing with homicide would be meaning27. Foster v. People, 50 N. Y. 598 (1872) (Felony murder, except during the commission of arson, was of the second degree at this time); People v. Hilter, 184 N. Y. 237,
77 N. E. 6 (190); People v. Spolfr, 206 N. Y. 516, 100 N. E. 444 (1912); People v.
Moran, 246 N. Y. 100, 158 N. E. 35 (1927); People v. Lazar, 271 N. Y. 27, 2 N. E. (2d)
32 (1936).
It has been held, on analogous reasoning, that for a homicide during the

commission of a crime less than felony to be manslaughter, there must be a crime independent from the homicide. People v. Rector, 19 Wend. 569 (N. Y. 1838); People v.
Butler, 3 Park. Crim. Rep. 377 (N. Y. 1857); People v. Grieco, 266 N. Y. 48, 193 N. E.

634 (1934).
28. N. Y. PF.,Tr. LAW (1909) §§ 240 and 241. People v. Randazzo, 127 App. Div. 824,
112 N. Y. Supp. 104 (4th Dep't 1908).
29. See note 27, supra.
30. People v. Cole, 2 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 108 (1883). This case held that a homicide during a felonious assault might be felony murder. See also Buel v. People) 78 N. Y. 492
(1879) which had held that a killing of the victim of rape was felony murder and which
had, in its opinion, criticized the earlier cases of People v. Rector, People v. Butler and
Foster v. People (cited supra in note 27). Homicide during rape will be discuszed later
in this paper.
31. See, for example, People v. Sweeny, 41 Hun 332, 340 (N. Y. 1886).
32. See note 9, supra.
33. See notes 14 and 15, sura.
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less. 4 Murder in the second degree and some cases of manslaughter
in the first and second degrees involve felonious assault on the person
killed 5 and yet if these assaults were not held to be merged in the homicide they would all be murder in the first degree.
But while an assault is merged in the homicide if it is the victim of
the assault, who dies, this is not so if the one killed is someone other
than the person assaulted. If, in our hypothetical case, A were committing a felonious assault on B, and C intervened and was killed, A
would be guilty of felony murder.30 Thus we have the seemingly
anomalous situation that if a man, without deliberation or premeditation, attempts to kill another, he is not guilty of murder in the first
-degree if he slays his intended victim, but he is guilty of murder in the
first degree if a third person against whom the defendant may bear no
ill will at all is killed. The distinction, nevertheless, is sound, for in
the first case there is a merger of the assault in the homicide and in the
second, the original assault is the independent felony.
A difficulty arising in connection with the cases in which one party
is assaulted and another killed, has its source in the rule that the homicide must occur while the assault is still in progress. If the accused
has already completed his assault on the first victim before he kills
the second, the homicide is not during the commission of a felony, 7 and
yet the assault on the one and the infliction of the fatal wound on
the other must not be so close in point of time as to amount really to
one continuous assault on two persons. In People v. Moran,"8 the
-defendant pointed his gun at two police officers, ordering them to hold
up their hands. He then rapidly fired several shots and killed both
-officers. In the lower court he was convicted of murder during the
commission of a felony, but on appeal this conviction was reversed,
the court holding that there was but one assault on two victims and
that this assault was merged in the resultant homicide of each.
Another difficult question presented by the assault case is whether a
man can be convicted of felony murder where he attempts to kill one
34.
35.

People v. Wagner, 245 N. Y. 143, 156 N. E. 664 (1927).
N. Y. Psr.AL LAW (1909) §§ 1046, 1050 and 1052. Section 1046, for example,

-defines murder in the second degree as, "Such killing of a human being is murder in the
second degree, when committed with a design to effect the death of the person killed, or

of another, but without deliberation and premeditation," and is exemplified by the
hypothetical case presented in the text.
36. People v. Giblin, 115 N. Y. 196, 21 N. E. 1062 (1889); People v. Patini, 208 N.
Y. 176, 101 N. E. 694 (1913); People v. Wagner, 245 N. Y. 143, 156 N. E. 644 (1927).
37. People v. Spohr, 206 N. Y. 516, 100 N. E. 444 (1912); People v. Marendl, 213
N. Y. 600, 107 N. E. 1058 (1915); People v. Moran, 246 N. Y. 100, 158 N. E. 35
(1927). The necessity of the continuance of the underlying felony will be treated in more
-detail infra.
38. 246 N. Y. 100, 158 N. E. 35 (1927).
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person and by mischance kills another. Is the homicide of the person
actually killed in such a case committed during the commission of the
felonious assault attempted on the intended victim? If it is, then a
felony murder has been committed."
Or is it rather a case to which
the merger theory should be extended, to wit, an assault on one person
merging in the homicide of another? It would appear that the second
theory represents the better view,4" and for the very reason that gave
rise to the doctrine of merger, namely, unless such a theory is adopted,
some of the language of the homicide statutes is meaningless. According to subdivision I of Section 1044 of the New York Penal Law,
deliberate and premeditated murder is committed whether the homicidal design was against the person killed or another, and also, under
Section 1046, murder in the second degree is committed whether the
person killed was the intended victim or not. And so, if A aims a shot
at B intending to kill him, but the bullet enters C's heart instead, A
should be guilty of murder in the first or second degree depending on
the presence or absence of deliberation and premeditation, for such a
case falls exactly within the wording of these Sections.
In order, therefore, to constitute a felony murder the elements of the
felony must be so distinct from those of the homicide as not to be an
ingredient of the homicide, indictable therewith or convictable thereunder.'
But the killing of a woman during the commission of rape
is felony murder.42 The reason for this is that although violence is an
essential ingredient of this felony, there is, in addition to the violence,
an element neither essential nor common to homicide, that is, sexual
intercourse. If, then, the accused was engaged in the commission of
rape, a homicide by him, either of the victim 4 3 of the rape or of a third
party intervening as a rescuer," is felony murder.
But the stated test of the identity of the elements of the homicide
and the felony does not seem to have been applied consistently in
other cases. Suppose, for example, that the accused, in resisting the
attempts of an officer to place him under arrest, kills the officer. At
common law, as we have already seen,45 the accused was guilty of
39. See note 36, supra.
40. See People v. Spohr, 206 N. Y. 516, 521, 100 N. E. 444, 456 (1912). See also People
v. Van Norman, 231 N. Y. 454, 458, 132 N. E. 147, 148 (1921) in which the court intimated that such would be its holding if the question were squarely before it. But see
People v. Miles, 143 N. Y. 383, 388, 38 N. E. 456, 458 (1894).
41. This was the test enunciated in People v. Hfiter, 184 N. Y. 237, 77 N. E. 6 (1906)
and approved in People v. Spohr, 206 N. Y. 516, 100 N. E. 444 (1912).
42. Buel v. People, 78 N. Y. 492 (1879); People v. Wolter, 203 N. Y. 484, 97 N. E.
30 (1911); People v. Schermerhorn, 203 N. Y. 57, 96 N. E. 376 (1911).
43. See note 42, supra.
44.
43.

See note 36, supra.
See note 17, supra.
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murder without regard to the question of the commission of a felony,
for this was one of the cases of murder with implied malice prepense.
In New York, an assault with the intent to resist lawful arrest is a
felony, 46 but since it is classified as one type of assault, it has been
held that this felony is merged in a homicide committed on the arresting party. 47 But despite its classification in the statute, it seems the
courts might have held that this assault, like rape, contains an ingredient in addition to violence, in this case, resistance to lawful arrest.
Another case in which the court, it is submitted, failed to apply the
test of merger uniformly is People v. Marendi5 where it apparently
agreed that the felony of carrying a weapon was merged in the homicide. The elements of such a felony do not seem identical with the
elements of homicide. Of course, if no attempt to arrest is made, then
the killing of a police officer by one who has been stopped for questioning is not during the commission of any felony.4 9 On the other
hand, if an arrest for a felony already committed is actually effected
and the accused reduced to custody, then the death of the arresting
officer caused by the accused in attempting his escape is chargeable to
him as a felony murder; 05 an attempt to escape from lawful arrest
for a felony is not merely a type of assault but is a separate felony,
classified in an altogether different division of the statute. 1 So too,
if a homicide is committed during an attempted escape from a state
prison, felony murder is committed, 2 for such an attempt is a felony.53
A striking example of the necessity of an independent underlying
felony is to be found in People v. Roper. 4 Roper was a youth under
the age of sixteen and had killed a man during a holdup. Section 2186
of the Penal Law provides, in part: "A child of more than seven and
less than sixteen years of age, who has committed any act or omission which, if committed by an adult, would be a crime not punishable
by death or life imprisonment, shall not be deemed guilty of any
crime, but of juvenile delinquency .... "1 The lower court had charged
46. N. Y. PENAL LAW (1909) § 242 (5) defines this as assault in second degree.
47. People v. Hilter, 184 N. Y. 237, 77 N. E. 6 (1906).
The trial court had charged
48. 213 N. Y. 600, 606, 107 N. E. 1058, 1059 (1915).
"that the carrying of a dangerous weapon . . . was merged in the larger crime, that Is,
the shooting, and cannot be considered as a felony which he was in the act of commit"
The Court of Appeals seemingly approved of
ting while the shooting was done ...
this instruction to the jury.
49. Ibid.
50. People v. Wilson, 145 N. Y. 628, 40 N. E. 392 (1895).
51. N. Y. PENAL LAW (1909) § 1694.
52. People v. Johnson, 110 N. Y. 134, 17 N. E. 684 (1888); People v. Flanigan, 174
N. Y. 356, 66 N. E. 988 (1903); People v. Udwin, 254 N. Y. 255, 172 N. E. 489 (1930).
53. N.Y. PENAL LAW (1909) § 1694.
54. 259 N. Y. 170, 181 N. E. 88 (1932).
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the jury that if they found the defendant was engaged in a robbery
in any degree at the time of the homicide they could bring in a verdict
of murder in the first degree. The Court of Appeals reversed the
conviction and pointed out that while a youth under the age of sixteen
could be guilty of murder in the first degree since that crime is punishable by death, 5 he could not be guilty of the felony of robbery (but
of juvenile delinquency only) and therefore there was no independent
felony to lay the basis for a conviction on the theory of felony murder 0°
In one situation, however, the Court of Appeals has not applied the
theory of the necessity of an underlying felony so syllogistically. In
homicide cases generally, no conviction can be had on the confession of
the accused alone, for there must be evidence independent of the defendant's statements that a killing took place.07 This rule also applies
to felonies other than homicide. 8 It would seem, then, that if the
accused has confessed to a homicide during the commission of a felony,
the mere finding of a slain body would not be sufficient corroboration,
since there would have to be evidence aside from the confession of the
commission of the independent felony. This view was expressed by
Judge Crane in a concurring opinion in People v. Joyce,* but it has
since been repudiated by the Court of Appeals, 0 on the ground that
there need be corroboration only of the fact that a homicide has been
committed since the existence of the felony goes only to the degree
of the homicide. It is submitted that Judge Crane's argument is more
in accord with the policy of rejecting unsubstantiated confessions for, as
he pointed out,"1 in an ordinary homicide case a jury may bring in a
55. N. Y. PENAL LAW (1909) § 1045; People v. Murch, 263 N. Y. 285$ 189 N. E. 220
(1934).
56. Compare People v. Udwin, 254 N. Y. 255, 172 N. E. 255 (1930), where one of the
defendants claimed that he was legally incapable of committing the independent felony of

escaping from a state prison because of the peculiar wording of the statute. This point
is discussed later under Accomplices, infra at p. 58.

Note also in the Roper Case that,

had the lower court specifically instructed the jury that they could find Roper guilty of
murder if they found that he committed homicide while engaged in first degree robbery,
there was a possibility of the coniction being affirmed. This possibility existed because
robbery in the first degree, at that time, was punishable by indeterminate sentence, and
the sentence might be life imprisonment.
57. N. Y. CoDE Cpr=r. PRoc. (1881) § 395.
58. N. Y. CODE C=. PRoc. (1S81) § 395; People v. Kelly, 37 Hun 160 (N. Y. 18S5);
People v. Krauss, 192 App. Div. 403, 182 N. Y. Supp. 715 (Ist Dep't 1920).
59. 233 N. Y. 61, 134 N. E. 836 (1922). The following cases also seem in accord with
the Yeasoning expressed by Judge Crane, although in each there was proof, in addition
to the defendant's confession, that. both a homicide and the independent felony bad been
committed, People v. McGloin, 91 N. Y. 241 (1883); People v. Giusto, 206 N. Y. 67,
99 N. E. 190 (1912).
60. People v. Lytton, 257 N. Y. 310, 178 N. E. 290 (1931).
61. People v. Joyce, 233 N. Y. 61, 74, 134 N. E. 836, 841 (1922).
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verdict of conviction in a lesser degree, 2 whereas in a true felony murder
the jury is limited to first degree murder or acquittal.0 3 If a confession
of homicide may be exacted when none in fact was committed, is it not
equally true that a confession of a felony during an admitted homicide
may also be exacted though no independent felony was in fact committed? Both cases seem to fall within the spirit and purpose of the
statutes requiring corroborating proof of the defendant's confession.
Nature of the Underlying Felony
Passing from the felonies which are merged in the homicide our
problem of determining what felonies are included in the doctrine of
felony murder becomes more obscured. We must again go to the
common law for aid in properly investigating this question. In the
Institutes, Coke generalizes on the principle underlying the felony
murder rule as follows: "If the act be unlawful, it is murder."0" This.
broad statement was never accepted as the law in England. A number
of authorities repudiated it and limited the rule to cases where the accused was engaged in conduct which was not merely unlawful but
felonious. This was the view of Chief Justice Holt in the case of Rex
T
0
v. Plummer, 5 and it was thereafter accepted by Foster, BlackstoneO
and East. 8 Later, however, even this modification of the rule was
criticized as too harsh and the further limitation was suggested that
an unintentional homicide during the commission of a felony should be
murder when, and only when, the felony was one in which there was.
a recognizable risk of death or serious bodily injury to another. 0 This
would have restricted felony murder to the so-called dangerous felonies
such as arson, robbery, rape and burglary. In Regina v. Sern6,'0
Stephen rejected the rule as laid down by the earlier authorities and
62.

N. Y. PENAL LAW (1909)

§ 610; N. Y. CODE CRIaM.

PROc. (1900)

§ 444.

63. "So far as concerns the killing of a human being by one engaged in the commission of a felony, conviction in a lesser degree than murder in the first degree is not justified." People v. Monat, 200 N. Y. 308, 312, 93 N. E. 982, 983 (1911). The right of
the Trial Court to limit the jury to a verdict of acquittal or of murder in the first
degree in felony murder cases is discussed inJra, pp. 69, 70.
64. 3 CORE, INST. 56. Italics inserted.

65. Kelyng 109, 84 Eng. Reprints 1103 (1701).
66.

CROWN LAW, 258.

67. 4 BL. Comm. *200.
68. 1 EAST P. C. 255.
69. Regina v. Sern6, 16 Cox C. C. 311 (1887); Regina v. Whitmarsh, 62 Just. Peame
711, 712 (1898); Director of Public Prosecutions v. Beard, A. C. 479, 493 (1920). SeC
3 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRi=AL LAW (1883) 57, 69, 75 where the author, whUiL
conceding that the limitation of the doctrine to felonies was leIs monstrous than Coke'&
theory, criticizes Holt and Foster for accepting the doctrine at all.
70. 16 Cox C. C. 311 (1887).

1937]

FELONY MURDER IN NEW YORK

said, "I think that instead of saying that any act done with intent to
commit a felony and which causes death amounts to murder, it would
be reasonable to say that any act known to be dangerous to life and
likely in itself to cause death, done for the purpose of committing a
7
felony which caused death, should be murder." '
Stephen's language may be criticized as abolishing common law felony
murders entirely, for, by its test, there is no necessity of resorting to
the felony to convict the accused of murder since, at common law,
conduct known to be dangerous to life and, in fact, resulting in death
was murder even if it did not involve the commission of a felony. "
On the other hand, the answer to this criticism might well be that the
entire doctrine was smuggled" into the common law, and that no
objection was originally raised because frequently the underlying felony
during which the homicide was committed was itself punishable by
death and it was immaterial on what theory the felon was hanged just
so long as he was hanged. 4
The more modern English authorities75 seem to have adopted the
theory that the accused is guilty of felony murder only if he kills another while engaged in the commission of a felony involving foreseeable
risk of danger to human life. This is a sound interpretation of the
rationale of the doctrine. If one embarks on a criminal venture in
which, as a reasonable man, he knows that the lives of others will be
endangered, he should be held to answer for such fatal results as do
ensue. The mere fact that he may not have had a specific intent to
kill should not excuse if he chooses by his conduct to jeopardize the
safety of others. On the other hand, a man's guilt or innocence of
murder for an unintentional killing should not be dependent upon
whether the law has defined his conduct as merely unlawful or as a misdemeanor or as a felony. This is even more evident in cases where
the risk of danger to another is not reasonably to be anticipated. But
whichever of the common law views is accepted as soundest from the
standpoint of policy, there seems little doubt that a further extension
of the rule to include all statutory as well as common law felonies
would be most unwise. The possibility of such a broadening of the doctrine, however, exists in our statute today.
71. Italics inseted.
72. See note 11, supra.
73.

"This astonishing doctrine has so far prevailed as to have been recognized as part

of the law of England by many subsequent writers.... It has been repeated so often that
I amongst others have not only accepted it, though with regret, but have acted upon it"
3 STEP=, HISTORY or TH CREIAL LAw (1883) 57.
74. See Powers v. Commonwealth, 110 Ky. 386, 413, 61 S. W. 735, 742 (1901);
LAw (1883) 75.
3 STEuw, HSToRY oF Hs CRnns.
75. See note 69 supra; 9 HASBuRY'S LAws or Es.%GAn- (2d ed. 1933) 437. See also
Rex v. Elnick, 53 D. L. R. 298 (1920), and Comment, 5 CA.;ADL%.; B,%R REvnw 68.
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At common law a felony was an offense for which the punishment
might be a total forfeiture of lands or goods, or both, and to which
capital or other punishment might be added." This included the crimes
of arson, burglary, robbery, rape and larceny which were mala in se
and which, with the possible exception of larceny, involved the element
of physical danger to others. In New York, while there is no forfeiture
of lands or goods, the principle of determining the grade of the offense
by the character of the punishment provided is still recognized " and
we find that a felony is defined by Section 2 of the Penal Law as follows: "A crime which is or may be punishable by death or imprisonment in a state prison. ' 78 Within this definition, fall many crimes which
are not only merely mala prohibita but which are also non-dangerous
in character. It is to be noted, moreover, that the criterion for determining whether or not an offense is a felony is not the minimum but
the maximum penalty provided, for the statute says: "is or may be"
punishable by imprisonment in a state prison. It has been held, therefore, that an offense is a felony even though imprisonment in a city
or county jail or a fine may be imposed as sentence, provided it is also
possible under the statute to inflict as punishment imprisonment in a
state prison.7 Nor is it conclusive that the statute defines an act as a
misdemeanor, for if the penalty provided calls for imprisonment in a
state prison, it is a felony regardless of what the legislature may term
it.80 Whether New York will limit the doctrine to felonies which involve
a foreseeable risk of danger to others is open to doubt. The argument
that the earlier common law authorities did not state the rule accurately when they said without qualification that a homicide during the
commission of a felony was murder cannot very well be advanced in the
face of a statute which does say without qualification that a homicide
during the commission of a felony is murder.8" The Court of Appeals
76. 4 BL. Comm. *94.
77. People v. Lyon, 99 N. Y. 210, 1 N. E. 673 (1885).
78. Italics inserted.
79. People v. Park, 41 N. Y. 21 (1869) [this case held that burglary in the third degree
was a felony even if committed by a child under the age of 16, because the offense was
generally punishable by imprisonment in a state prison, even though the child might have
been sent to a Reform School under Chap. 100, Laws of 1840, and Chap. 24, Laws of
1850. See dissenting opinion and compare People v. Roper, 259 N. Y. 170, 181 N. E.
88 (1932)]; People v. Hughes, 137 N. Y. 29, 32 N. E. 1105 (1893); People v. Borges,
6 Abb. Pr. 132 (N. Y. 1858); People v. Hayman, 94 Misc. 624, 159 N. Y. Supp. 981
(1916). But see Fassett v. Smith, 23 N. Y. 252 (1861) where the court said that in oil
cases where an offense is not specifically labelled a felony by the statute, the common
law governs: This case was later criticized by People v. Lyon, 99 N. Y, 210, 1 N. E.

673 (1885).
80.
81.

People v. Bellinger, 269 N. Y. 265, 191 N. E. 213 (1935).
So far as the language of the felony murder statute is concerned, it might be con-
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has assumed in some cases, without deciding, that a homicide during
the commission of the felony of larceny is murder in the first degree 8 2
And while the weight of authoritys outside of New York supports the
view that the creation of new statutory felonies did not effect rules
of the common law which on principle applied only to common law
felonies, the history of the statute in New York"' seems to indicate
that it was the legislative intent to include all felonies within the operation of the doctrine. The statute at one time specifically named the
felonies which raised a homicide during their commission to murder,
and the omission of such an enumeration today supports the inference that felony murder is not limited to any specific felonies 5 Although no case has been found in New York which has gone so far
as to hold that the doctrine applies to non-dangerous statutory felonies,
there are decisions which have extended it to felonies which are of
statutory origin only and did not exist at common law, and there is a
tended that the word "otherwise" refers back to "pesons" and means "other prons,"
thus limiting the operation of the felony murder rule to felonies against the person, either
of the one killed or of another. Some force is lent to this argument by the existence
of a separate subdivision in Section 1044 providing that the homicide during the commission of the felony of arson is murder in the first degree, for if all felonies were intended
to be included by the legislature, why the need of the arson subsection? This v.as the
defendant's contention in People v. Greenwall, 115 N. Y. 520, 22 N. E. 180 (1889), but
the court dismissed it saying, that "otherwise" should be interpreted to mean any felony.
82. See People v. Joyce, 233 N. Y. 61, 73, 134 N. E. 836, 841 (1922); People v. Wagner,
245 N. Y. 143, 147, 156 N. E. 644, 645 (1927); People v. Moran, 246 N. Y. 1C0, 102, 158
N. E. 35, 36 (1927); People v. Willett, 36 Hun 500, 507 (N. Y. 1885).
83. People v. Pavlic, 227 Mich. 562, 199 N. W. 373 (1924). See Thiede v. State, 106
Neb. 48, 182 N. W. 570 (1921); State v. Reitze, 86 N. J. L. 407, 403, 92 At. 576, 577
(1914). But cf. State v. Smith, 32 Mle. 369 (1851); Id., 33 Me. 48 (1851) which was explained as follows in Powers v. Commonwealth, 110 Ky. 386, 414, 61 S. W. 735, 741
(1901): "With the adoption of the English common law in the various jurisdictions in
this country, and its modifications by statute, there came the question whether this doctrine applied to statutory felonies which were not felonies at common law. In come of
the jurisdictions it was held without qualification that it did. It may be remarked that,
in many of the earlier cases, the attempted offense was abortion; and it may be that the
moral turpitude of this offense, not at common law a felony, had effect in determining
the question."
84. The first statute (2 N. Y. Riv. STAT. [1829] 657, § 5 [3] specifically stated "any
felony." In 1860 the statute was amended to enumerate the specific felonies of arson,
rape, robbery, burglary and attempted escape from imprisonment as the ones durng
the commission of which homicide was murder in the first degree (Laws 1860, c.
410, § 2). In 1862, this enumeration was omitted, but homicides during the commiLsson
of felonies other than arson were reduced to murder in the second degree (Lavs 1862,
c. 197, § 5), but later all felony murders were again made of the first degree (Laws
1876, c. 333, § 1). The present statute, except for a few minor changes and except for
the substitution of the article "a" for the adjective "any" is substantially the same as
this last one.
85. See Fitzgerold v. People, 37 N. Y. 413, 427b--427e (1868).
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very powerful dictum in one case 6 to the effect that all felonies are
included. In People v. Van Steenburg,8 7 the court held that a homicide
committed by one, who was at the time armed and masquerading as an
Indian, was murder because by statute it was a felony to go armed and
disguised. In People v. Deacons,"' the court held that a tramp who
had entered a building under circumstances not amounting to burglary
was guilty of murder for a homicide he had committed therein because
of a statutory provision8" making it a felony for a tramp to enter a
building without the owner's consent.
Accomplices
Before taking up the question of the necessity of the continuance
of the underlying felony at the time the homicide takes place and to
pave the way for such discussion, it may prove helpful at this time to
enlarge the scope of our treatment, which thus far has been limited to
the liability of the actual killer, and to investigate the guilt of confederates. It is a general rule in criminal law that where a man combines with another to commit a felony, he impliedly consents to the
use of whatever means are usual or may prove necessary in accomplishing it, and if such means involve a homicide, he is responsible therefor.90 A discussion of the common law distinctions between principals
in the first and second degree and accessories before the fact is unnecessary to our inquiry, for, in New York these distinctions have been
abolished by the following provision in the Penal Law:
"A person concerned in the commission of a crime, whether he directly commits the act constituting the offense or aids and abets in its 6ommission, and
whether present or absent, and a person who directly or indirectly counsels,
commands, induces or procures another to commit a crime, is a 'principal'."' 1
86. ". . . as often as the legislature creates new felonies, or raises offenses which were only
misdemeanors at the common law to the grade of felony, a new class of murders is created
by the application of this principle to the case of a killing of a human being, by a person who

is engaged in the perpetration of a newly created felony. So, on the other hand, when
the legislature abolishes an offence which at the common law was a felony, or reduces
it to the grade of a misdemeanor only, the case of an unlawful killing, by a person engaged in the act which was before a felony, will no longer be considered to be murder,
but manslaughter merely." People v. Enoch, 13 Wend. 159, 175 (N. Y. 1834). (The
statute at that time said "any felony.")
87. 1 Park. Cr. 39 (Del. 1845).
88. 109 N. Y. 374, 16 N. E. 676 (1888).
89.

N. Y. PENAL LAW (1909)

§ 2371.

90. Anarchists' Case (Spies v. People) 122 IIl. 1, 12 N. E. 865 (1887); Roesel v. State,
62 N. J. L. 216, 41 Atl. 408 (1898); Carrington v. People, 6 Park. Crim. Rep. 336 (N. Y.
1865) ; State v. Cannon, 49 S.C. 550, 27 S. E. 526 (1897); Mansell & Herbet's Case,
2 Dyer 128b (1536).
91. N. Y. PENAL LAW (1909) § 2; People v. Blivan, 112 N. Y. 79, 19 N. E. 638 (1889);
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It is apparent, therefore, that Section 1044, although it speaks of a

homicide "by a person"9 2 engaged in a felony, includes all who are
principals in the eyes of the law whether they be the actual killers or
not. There is a long line of decisions in New York holding that where
one engages in the commission of a felony with others, he is responsible
for a homicide committed by one of his confederates during the prosecution of their common design. 93 If the accused aided or abetted in
the commission of the felony he cannot escape liability by showing
that he was in a different part of the premises at the time of the slaying

and was wholly unaware of it,94 or that he was merely a lookout for the
rest of the band,9" or that he never was near the premises but was
miles away when the felony and homicide were being committed, 0
or that he counselled against the use of any force, 7 or that he called

out to his confederates to desist when force became necessary,"s or
even that he attempted to stop them in their use of violence."

In all

these cases, as in the case of the actual killer, the accomplice's guilt
is not predicated upon the intent to kill, but on the constructive malice

imputed to him from his engaging in the commission of a felony.
There is language in some of the cases 00 to the effect that the test
People v. Kief, 126 N. Y. 661, 27 N. E. 556 (1891); People v. Florence, 146 MiJic. 735,
262 N. Y. Supp. 775 (Gen. Sess. 1933).
92. Italics inserted.
93. Ruloff v. People, 45 N. Y. 213 (1871); People v. Giro, 197 N. Y. 133, 90 N. E.
432 (1910); People v. Friedman, 205 N. Y. 161, 98 N. E. 471 (1912); People v. Giusto,
206 N. Y. 67, 99 N. E. 190 (1912); People v. Chapman, 224 N. Y. 331, 121 N. E. 381;
People v. Nichols, 230 N. Y. 221, 129 N. E. 883 (1921); People v. Mlartone, 256 N. Y.
395, 176 N. E. 544 (1931).
94. People v. Giusto, 206 N. Y. 67, 99 N. E. 190 (1912).
95. People v. Usefof, 227 N. Y. 622, 125 N. E. 923 (1919) (the defendant in that case
was a lookout and was convicted of first degree murder in Bronx County Supreme Court.
The conviction was affirmed without opinion). See People v. Michalow, 229 N. Y. 325,
330, 128 N. E. 228, 230 (1920).
96. People v. Michalow, 229 N. Y. 325, 128 N. E. 228 (1920) (reversed on other
grounds).
97. See People v. Friedman, 205 N. Y. 161, 165, 98 N. E. 471, 475 (1912).
98. People v. Nichols, 230 N. Y. 221, 129 N. E. 883 (1921).
99. In People v. Friedman, 205 N. Y. 161, 98 N. E. 471 (1912) there was some evidence that the accused attempted to wrest the gun from the hand of his accomplice
when the shooting began.
100. See People v. Udwin, 254 N. Y. 255, 263, 172 N. E. 489, 492 (1930) ; People v. Giro,
197 N. Y. 152, 158, 90 N. E. 432, 435 (1910). "If the natural and probable consequence
of the common enterprise was the killing of Mr. Schuchart in case of resistance on his
part, the defendant was liable for murder in the first degree, although he did not do
the actual killing.... An express agreement by intending robbers not to kill in carrying
out a plan of robbery would not save any of the conspirators from responsibility for a
homicide by one of them in committing or attempting to commit the robbery, if such hil
ing was the natural and probable result of the robbery. . . !' (Italics inserted). People'
v. Friedman, 205 N. Y. 161, 165, 98 N. E. 471, 473 (1912).
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of the liability of an accused for a homicide by one of his associates
during the commission of a felony is whether the killing was a natural
and probable result of the felony. This would seem to indicate that
unless the felony is one of a class ordinarily considered dangerous
and one in which there is a recognizable risk of harm to others, a
homicide committed by one of a band of felons cannot be imputed to the
others. However sound this may be in principle, it certainly is not consistent with the view expressed in other New York cases that the killer
himself is guilty regardless of the nature of the underlying felony. 10 1
But if the law seems to favor the confederate by requiring that the
killing be a natural and probable result of the felony, it is not so lenient
with him in other respects. Consider, for example, that: (a) a confederate may be guilty of murder in the first degree as a principal to
a felony murder although he is legally incapable of committing the
felony by himself and (b) an accomplice may be guilty of murder in
the first degree although the killer himself is not. Only one case has
been discovered in which the court followed the first rule set out above.
In People v. Udwin,1 °2 the defendant with a number of other prisoners
attempted to escape from a state prison. During the "break" one of
the conspirators was accidentally shot. and killed by another and the
survivors were indicted for felony murder. One of the defendants was
a life termer and he contended that although the statute provided that
an attempted escape from a state prison was a felony, it specifically
exempted life termers from its operation.103 The court nevertheless
held that since he was an accomplice of others, legally capable of committing that felony, he was a principal to their felony under Section 2
of the Act 0 4 and therefore guilty of first degree murder. The second
rule set out above is not so harsh as may appear on the surface, and
though no case can be found directly in point, it is submitted that this
conclusion is justified. If A and B conspire to commit robbery, and
during the robbery B kills the victim, both are guilty of felony murder.
But if B could prove that at the time of the robbery he was either insane or so intoxicated as to be incapable of entertaining a specific intent,
B would not be guilty of felony murder, for the gist of the crime of
robbery is larceny from the person, and larceny requires the specific
intent to steal. Thus, if the jury believes that B was incapable of
forming any specific intent, the underlying felony would not exist so
101. See pp. 54-56, supra.
102. 254 N. Y. 255, 172 N. E. 489 (1930).
103. N. Y. PauN.,kL LAW (1929) § 1695 provides: "A prisoner confined in a state prison
for a term less than life., who attempts by force or fraud, although unsuccessful, to escape
from such prison, is guilty of felony." (Italics inserted.)
104. See note 91, supra.
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far as he was concerned.l °a There is no reason, however, why this
defense which is personal to B should be available to A. So also in
People v. Roper,0 0 where the court held that a boy under the age of
sixteen could not be guilty of felony murder because he was incapable
of committing the independent felony, it seems his accomplice in the
crime could have been convicted of felony murder if the accomplice
was over sixteen years of age regardless of who did the actual killing'O,

Before the accused may be held for a homicide committed by one
of his accomplices it must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt that
10 3
the murder was committed in the execution of the conspired felony.
Suppose, for example, that A and B burglarize a house. B, looking
out of the window of the house in which they are committing the felony,
notices C, an old enemy of his, across the street and thereupon he shoots
and kills C. It is true that at the time C was killed both A and B
were engaged in the commission of a felony. But A certainly should
not be held for that homicide since it was not in pursuance of their
common design. 0 9 If the one slain is the victim of the felony involved,
it would obviously be almost impossible for the defendant to prove that
the homicide committed by one of his confederates was not in furtherance of the felony, but the Court of Appeals has indicated that this
Perhaps the best case to illusmay be shown even in such a case."
trate the requirement that the killing be within the scope of the conspiracy is one in which the question was not felony murder at all but
which, nevertheless, emphasizes that there must be a community of purpose for one conspirator to be charged with a homicide committed by
another. In People v. Sobieskoda,"' the defendant conspired with an105. People v. Koerber, 244 N. Y. 147, 155 N. E. 79 (1926) (though this case did not
involve a confederate, it is submitted, that its reasoning is in point).
106. 259 N. Y. 170, 181 N. E. 88 (1932).
107. N. Y. PF-xAL LAW (1909) § 2186, after providing that in cases of crimes for
which the sentence in the case of an adult would be less than death or life impriso mnent
such acts shall be merely juvenile delinquency if committed by a child over seven and
under sixteen years of age, goes on to provide: "but any other person concerned therein,
whether as principal or accessory, who otherwise would be punishable as a principal or
accessory shall be punishable as a principal or accessory in the same manner as if such
child were over sixteen years of age at the time the crime was committed?'
108. People v. Ryan, 263 N. Y. 298, 189 N. E. 225 (1934); see People v. Collins, 234
N. Y. 355, 361, 137 N. E. 753, 756 (1922); Ruloff v. People, 45 N. Y. 213, 216 (1871).
109. See note 108, supra.
110. "The circumstantial evidence must be sufficient to permit an inference free from
reasonable doubt that Cassullo [the victim] was killed in the attempted execution of the
design to commit a robbery." People v. Ryan, 263 N. Y. 298, 303, 189 N. E. 225, 227
(1934). (Italics in original).
111. 235 N. Y. 411, 139 N. E. 558 (1923).
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other to murder the husband of the defendant's paramour. The gunman killed the brother of the intended victim instead. The Court of
Appeals held that it was error for the lower court to instruct the jury
that it was immaterial, in order to hold the defendant, with what intent
the deceased had been killed. The decision is sound. The charge of the
trial court which at first blush might seem to follow the exact language
of the Penal Law. 2 would permit the jury to convict the defendant
even though the actual killer may have slain the deceased for reasons
dehors the conspiracy. Although it would have been in furtherance of
the common design if the brother had been killed while coming to the
aid of the intended victim, allowance must be made for the possible
situation wherein the conspirator for his own personal reasons killed
the brother. In the latter case, the homicide would not be within the
common purpose and so not chargeable to the other conspirator.
Necessity of the Continuance of the Underlying FelonyEscape and Abandonment
In order to constitute a felony murder, whether the accused be the
actual killer or merely an accomplice, it is necessary that the felony
be in the course of commission at the time the homicide occurs. If the
felony has been completed, or if the accused has effectively severed his
connection with the criminal enterprise, he cannot be held on the theory
of felony murder for a homicide which subsequently takes place.118
This rule seems simple and entirely in accord with the statute and there
are cases" 4 in which the factual situation is such that only one conclusion can be drawn as to whether the homicide took place during the
commission of the felony, but some cases fall within a twilight zone
making difficult any dogmatic inference. Reference has already been
made 15 to the difficulty in the assault cases of determining whether
the attack on the first victim is separate in origin and purpose from the
fatal attack on the second so as to constitute a felony independent of
the homicide, and yet not so apart in point of time as to make the homicide an occurrence after the completion of the first felonious assault.
The attacks in such cases must be concomitant, yet they must be distinct.
112. It has been pointed out, p. 49, supra, that an intentional homicide may be committed even though the deceased was not the intended victim.
113. People v. Hiter, 184 N. Y. 237, 77 N. E. 6 (1906); People v. Spohr, 206 N. Y.
516, 100 N. E. 444 (1912); People v. Marwig, 227 N. Y. 382, 125 N. E. 535 (1919);
People v. Smith, 232 N. Y. 239, 133 N. E. 534 (1921); People v. Collins, 234 N. Y. 355,
137 N. E. 753 (1922); People v. Moran, 246 N. Y. 100, 158 N. E. 35 (1927); People
v. Walsh, 262 N. Y. 140, 186 N. E. 422 (1933).
114. See People v. Walsh, 262 N. Y. 140, 147, 186 N. E. 422, 424 (1933).
115. See notes 37 and 38, supra.
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Where the accused is fleeing from the scene of a completed or attempted crime, a killing during the course of his flight does not occur
during the commission of a felony,"0 for while escape from lawful
custody is a felony,"' flight from the scene of a crime is not. But
there are situations in which a qualification of this general rule appears
warranted. If there is no pursuit and a homicide occurs several miles
from the scene of the original crime or if some interval of time has
elapsed since the felony when the killing takes place the general rule
applies and the homicide is not a felony murder. But consider the following cases: (a) A robbery is committed in X's store, the robbers then
run from the store, and X, who immediately pursues them, is shot and
killed by one of the felons; or, (b) F's house has been burglarized, and
as the burglars are leaving his home Y seizes one of them and during
the struggle receives a mortal wound. the two cases seem very much
alike, and in both it could be argued that the killings are so intimately
connected with the robbery and burglary as to be parts of the res gestae
of those crimes and on this ground alone should be held to constitute
felony murders. There are a few cases in which the dicta, 1 8 at least,
appear to support this contention, but there are clear holdings'" that
while the New York courts recognize "that escape may, under certain
unities of time, manner and place, be a matter so immediately connected
with the crime as to be part of its commission' 20 they do not accept
the "res gestae" rule as a universal test. The two hypothetical cases
are distinguishable under the New York decisions. In People v.
Marwig,121 which is very similar to our first case, the accused and a
companion had entered the store of the deceased to commit either a
robbery or a larceny and the deceased fled into an adjoining store. The
thieves were then interrupted in their crime and ran from the premises
without any loot. One of them was seized by the proprietor in front
of the adjoining store, just a few feet from the store in which they had
attempted their crime, and in the fracas, the proprietor was killed. It
was held that this was not a felony murder on the ground that at the
time of the homicide no felony was in the course of commission since
the attempted robbery or larceny had already ended. The court, in
116. People v. Walsh, People v. Collins, People v. Mlawig, People v. Hilter, all cited
note 113, supra.
117. N. Y. PEnAL LAW (1929) § 1694.
I18. "All that they did was in furtherance of their original design to rob the houze,

and what they did to save themselves and escape was as much a part thereof as breaking
iz with the jimmy or stealing the pocketbook.' (Italics this writer's.) People v. Gro, 197
N. Y. 152, 157, 90 N. E. 432, 434 (1910); see Dolan v. People, 64 N. Y. 485, 497 (1876).
119. See note 113, supra.
120. People v. Walsh, 262 N. Y. 140, 148, 186 N. E. 422, 424 (1933).
121. 227 N. Y. 382, 125 N. E. 535 (1919).
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its opinion, laid great emphasis upon the fact that at the time of the
killing the felons were no longer on the premises on which the felony
took place. In People v. Michalow,122 on the other hand, one of the
robbers, fearing identification, bound the victim of the robbery in such
a way that she suffocated. The court there held that the felony was
still in progress when the homicide took place even though the felons
had already secured their loot at that time. From these cases it seems
clear that the problem of the continuance of the underlying felony cannot always be solved merely by determining whether the accused at
the time of the killing, had already accomplished the primary end of
his criminal undertaking. And, although an important distinction in
the cases last discussed was that in the one case he was no longer on
the premises when the homicide was committed, and in the other he
was, presence of the accused on the premises is not conclusive. In
People v. Smith 2 3 the defendant was committing robbery when he was
reduced to capture by his victims. While one of his captors telephoned
for the police, the accused managed somehow to get possession of a
gun, and with it he shot and killed the other. Although the accused
was still on the premises at the time of the homicide he certainly was
no longer engaged in a robbery when the killing took place, and so the
court held, pointing out that while presence on the premises was
an important factor, it was by no means conclusive on the question of
whether a felony was still in the course of commission. 4 The following
tests have been used by the courts in solving this vexatious problem:
If the accused has committed a felony against a person, which in no
way involves property, the felony is complete as soon as he starts to
flee;' 25 if the accused has been interrupted before actually engaging in
the commission of a felony and before he has progressed so far as
to be guilty even of an attempted felony, there can be no felony murder; 1 26 if the defendant is off the premises and not in possession of
any loot, the felony is ended127 (unless the accused is still connected
with a conspiracy and one of his confederates is still engaged in the
122.

229 N. Y. 325, 128 N. E. 228 (1920)

(reversed on other grounds).

See also People

v. Giro, 197 N. Y. 152, 157, 90 N. E. 432, 434 (1910).
123.

232 N. Y. 239, 133 N. E. 574 (1921).

124. It should be noted that the accused may have been guilty of a homicide during
the commission of felonious escape from arrest (discussed, supra notes 50 and 51), but
this theory of guilt was not submitted to the jury.
125. People v. Marendi, 213 N. Y. 600, 107 N. E. 1058 (1915); People v. Moran, 246
N. Y. 100, 158 N. E. 35 (1927).
126. People v. Young, 40 Misc. 256, 81 N. Y. Supp. 967 (Sup. Ct. 1903); People v.
Collins, 234 N. Y. 355, 137 N. E. 753 (1922).
But cf. People v. Sullivan, 173 N. Y.

122, 65 N. E. 989 (1903).
127. People v. Hilter, 184 N. Y. 237, 77 N. E. 6 (1906); People v. Marwlg, 227
N. Y. 382, 125 N. E. 535 (1919).
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felony' 2 ); but if the accused is still in possession of his loot or is aiding
his accomplice to insure the removal of it this is evidence that the felony
is still in progress;u 9 finally, the defendant's presence on the premises,
like his possession of the loot, is evidence that the felony is still continuing,130 but it is not conclusive. 131
Where the homicide has been committed by conspirators there remain
two further questions to be determined: (a) Did the conspirators contemplate a killing during the course of flight, thus making the homicide part of the conspiracy, and, (b) have any of the conspirators
abandoned the felony before the commission of the homicide? The first
question is usually treated under the felony murder doctrine although
strictly it does not fall within its scope at all. Since conspiracy, of
itself, is not a felony, 32 it must be remembered that the mere fact that
the conspiracy is still in existence at the time of the homicide does not
automatically stamp such homicide as felony murder, 1"3 for it is entirely
possible that the conspiracy continue up to the division of the spoils
which might not occur until long after the felony has been completed.
Suppose that in the Marwig case, 13'
Marwig had agreed with Bojanowski
(his confederate) that in the event of interruption or threatened arrest
they should shoot to kill to effect their escape, and Bojanowski murdered the man who tried to apprehend him, would Marwig be guilty
of murder? He might be guilty as a principal to a deliberate and premeditated murder, 3 ' but he would not be guilty of felony murder, for,
as Judge Crane points out in that case, "Marwig would not be guilty
of murder in the first degree if after the robbery had been committed
and not while it was being committed his companion shot and killed
Weitz while they were aiding each other in trying to escape unless the
128. People v. Chapman, 224 N. Y. 463, 121 N. E. 381 (1918); People v. Michalow,
229 N. Y. 325, 128 N. E. 228 (1920); People v. Nichols, 230 N. Y. 221, 129 N. E. 883

(1921).
129. See People v. Walsh, 262 N. Y. 140, 148, 186 N. Y. 422, 424 (1933).
130. Dolan v. People, 64 N. Y. 485 (1876); People v. Meyer, 162 N. Y. 357, 56 N. E.
758 (1900); People v. Giro, 197 N. Y. 152, 90 N. E. 432 (1910); People v. Schleiman,
197 N. Y. 383, 90 N. E. 950 (1910); People v. Michalow, 229 N. Y. 325, 128 N. E. 228

(1920).

The Giro and Schleiman cases arose out of the came murder in which thee

two men were involved as accomplices. In both cases convictions of felony murder
were affirmed, and, although neither case discusses the factor of the defendants' presence on the premises at the time of the homicide, it is submitted that the cases are
defensible only on that theory for the burglars were very evidently trying to flee at
the time.
131. People v. Smith, 232 N. Y. 239, 133 N. E. 534 (1921); People v. WaLh, 262 N. i.
140, 186 N. E. 422 (1933); People v. Ryan, 263 N. Y. 298, 189 N. E. 225 (1934).
132. Conspiracy is defined as a misdemeanor under N. Y. Pmr, LAw (1909) § 5O.
133. People v. Collins, 234 N. Y. 355, 137 N. E. 753 (1922).
134. See note 121, supra.
135. People v. Emieleta, 238 N. Y. 158, 144 N. E. 487 (1924).
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jury should find premeditation and deliberation upon the part of Bojanowski."'' O In other words, the question as to whether the homicide was
or was not a felony murder depends not so much on any agreement the
confederates may have had as it does on the question of whether the
felony was still in existence at the time the killing took place.
The second question, abandonment, is a corollary of the rule that
the felony must be in existence at the time of the homicide, and at times
the two problems overlap. Even when the accused has fled from the
premises without any loot, his responsibility for a homicide by one of
his confederates who is still on the premises may continue unless the
defendant has effectively abandoned the conspiracy before the killing." 7 This is sound and consistent with the rule that a confederate
who does not even appear on the scene is guilty when the homicide is
committed by one of his co-conspirators during the commission of a
felony. 318 If, however, a conspirator has desisted to such an extent
that he has abandoned the entire criminal enterprise then he is not
responsible for a homicide thereafter committed by one of his former
associates. What, then, are the essentials of an effective abandonment?
The first and foremost is that the accused must have desisted from the
crime some time before the danger of death was imminent, and whether
there has been a sufficient interval of time is in the last analysis a
question of fact for the jury.'3 9 It would appear that another requisite
for an effective abandonment is that the one seeking to escape responsibility must have given notice of his intention to abandon to his fellow
conspirators, and that this notice must have been given in time to permit
them to abandon as well. 40 Of course, if his associates have already
desisted from the felony themselves, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, notice to them is unnecessary. An interesting case involving the
problem of abandonment is People v. Walsh.'4 1 In that case four men
engaged in a robbery. Three had entered the "speakeasy" which they
136. People v. Marwig, 227 N. Y. 382, 388, 125 N. E. 535, 537 (1919).
137. People v. Chapman, 224 N. Y. 463, 121 N. E. 381 (1918); People v. Nichols,
230 N. Y. 221, 129 N. E. 883 (1921).
138. See note 96, supra.
139. People v. Chapman, 224 N. Y. 463, 121 N. E. 381 (1918); People v. Nichols, 230
N. Y. 221, 129 N. E. 883 (1921).
140. People v. Nichols, 230 N. Y. 221, 129 N. E. 883 (1921). "He (defendant] afforded
Davis (confederate] no opportunity to abandon the further execution of the felony ...
Until he abr:ogated or nullified, to the knowledge of Davis and under such circumstances
as would permit Davis to take the same action as himself, by words or acts, the conspiracy and confederation between them, there was not an abandonment of the joint or
common design." (Italics inserted). People v. Chapman, 224 N. Y. 463, 478, 121 N. E.
381, 385 (1918).
141. 262 N. Y. 140, 186 N. E. 422 (1933).
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intended to rob, while one remained outside as a lookout. Walsh, one
of those who had entered the premises, went into a back room while his
two companions remained in the front part of the saloon. The police
intervened during the crime and arrested the two men in the front room.
Upon discovery of what had occurred, Walsh attempted to flee through
an exit, and, in so doing, he shot and killed an officer. This was held
not to be a felony murder. The two companions who were under arrest
were certainly no longer engaged in the commission of the felony of
robbery, nor was it necessary for Walsh to give them notice of his
intention to abandon, nor, finally, did Walsh's failure to give notice
to the lookout who had not as yet been arrested prolong the existence
of the robbery. The Court of Appeals pointed out that the mere presence of the lookout on the outside could not, as a practical matter
prolong a robbery which had in fact ended.
The Causal Relation
The problem of causation in felony murder has not been directly
involved in many cases. This is due, in part, to the fact that it is interwoven with the question already considered as to what felonies are
included in the doctrine, and in part, also, to the fact that there are
comparatively few rules relating to the problem which are peculiar to
this doctrine and not applicable to homicide cases generally. The test
of whether the homicide is a natural and probable result of the felonious act has been used in some jurisdictions to determine whether the
particular activity in which the defendant was engaged at the time
was included within the scope of the doctrine of felony murder, 42 and
in other cases to determine whether the felony committed was a cause
of the death.143 Frequently the two questions are identical but sometimes they are distinguishable. Arson, for example, falls within the
class of dangerous felonies and so is included within the doctrine of
felony murder even under the foreseeable consequences rule and yet it
was held in an English case144 that even though arson was committed,
142. See note 69, supra.
143. State v. Glover, 330 Mo. 709, 50 S. W. (2d) 1049 (1932); Burton v. State, 122
Tex. Crim. App. 363, 55 S. W. (2d) 813 (1932); Pleimling v. State, 46 Wis. S16, 1 N. W.
278 (1879).

144. "The law, however, is, that a man is not answerable except for the natural and
probable result of his own act; and therefore, if you should not be satisfied that the

deceased was in the barn or inclosure at the time the prisoner set fire to the stack, but
came in afterwards, then, as his own act intervened between the death and the act of the
prisoner, his death could not be the natural result of the prisones act." Regina v.
Horsey, 3 F. & F. 287, 289, 176 Eng. Reprints 129, 131 (N. P. 1862).

Compare State v.

Glover, 330 Mlo. 709, 50 S.W. (2d) 1049 (1932) where it was held that the death of a
fireman in a blaze caused by the accused was felony murder, and see Comment, 18 Sr.
Louis L. Rav. 350.
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it may nevertheless be shown that the death of another in the fire was
caused by his own voluntary act and thus was not a felony murder.
14
Aside from the cases involving the responsibility of a confederate, C
there is little authority to be found in New York subscribing to the
natural and probable consequences rule as a test in determining either
the felonies to be included in the doctrine, or the liability of the defendant for the homicide when the felony is clearly a dangerous one.
Where death is a direct result of a felonious act there is, of course,
no difficulty in establishing the causal relation. It might be argued in
such a case that to constitute felony murder there must be two acts,
one, the underlying felony and the other the act of homicide, but this
contention is not sound. Although it is necessary that there be a felony
independent of the homicide,14 it is not essential that there be independent acts, since the one act may at the same time constitute a separate felony and cause the death.' 47 Violence is a constitutive element
of the felony of robbery 148 and if the violence used in such a crime
causes death, felony murder is committed. 4 9 So too, where the very
act of rape causes death either because of the force used in effecting the
crime l° or because of a disease communicated to the victim by the
accused.' It seems, moreover, that if the felony being committed
causes death by fright, the perpetrator of the felony is guilty of felony
murder. 2
It has already been pointed out that, in order to convict one accomplice of felony murder for a homicid6 committed by another it is incumbent upon the prosecution to show that the killing was in furtherOther jurisdictions' 5 4 have held that the rule is
ance of the felony.'
the same even though the accused is the actual killer, but no decision has
145. See note 100, supra.
146. Supra, p. 46, et seq.
147. Buel v. People, 78 N. Y. 492 (1879). See People v. Hiter, 184 N. Y. 237, 244,
77 N. E. 6, 9 (1906).
148. N. Y. PENAL LAW (1909) § 2120; People v. Hall, 6 Park. Crim. Rep. 642 (N.

Y. 1865).
149.
150.

See note 25, supra.
Buel v. People, 78 N. Y. 492 (1879).

151.

Although no New York case has been found to support this, the instruction given

the jury in Regina v. Greenwood, Cox C. C. 404 (1857) authorized the jury to bring In

a verdict of guilty of murder in such a case.
152. Cox v. People, 80 N. Y. 500 (1880).
153. See note 108, supra.
154. In Burton v. State, 122 Tex. Crim. App. 363, 55 S. W. (2d) 813 (1932), the defendant was driving a car when a flat tire caused him to lose control, and the car struck
and killed another. The defendant was driving while intoxicated at the time of tho
accident, and this was a felony under the statute. It was held that the homicido was not
a felony murder. See also Pleimling v. State, 46 Wis. 516, 1 N. V. 278 (1879).
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been found in New York either accepting or rejecting the rule in such
a case. 155 The better view would seem to be that although the killing
need not be perpetrated by the accused intentionally to further his
criminal purpose, the act which results in death must have been done
in the furtherance of the felony. Mere coincidence of time between the
homicide and the felony should not suffice to make it felony murder,
if the act resulting in death was wholly disconnected from the commission of the underlying felony.
But no person can be held responsible for felony murder unless the
act of homicide was committed either by him or by someone acting in
consort with him. It has been held in jurisdictions outside New York
that if an officer fires at the defendant who is committing a felony and
kills an innocent bystander the homicide, not being the act of the accused, is not chargeable to him as a felony murder.'5 0 The Court of
Appeals has indicated that New York is in accord. In People v.
Udwn. 57 some prisoners were engaged in a prison break and one of
their number was killed. The court in holding that a felony murder
had been committed emphasized the fact that there was sufficient evidence that the deceased met his death from a wound inflicted by one
of the other convicts and not by a prison guard, implying that had no
such evidence existed, judgment would have had to be rendered for the
defendants on that ground. Three judges dissented because in their
opinion there was insufficient evidence on this point. No New York
case has gone so far as to hold that if the accused used an innocent
person as a shield for his own protection and placed him in the path of
a bullet intended for the accused this would not be a felony murder.
In other jurisdictions the courts have held that the accused in such a
case is the legal cause of the killing, and, if it occurred during the commission of a felony, the homicide is a felony murder.'59
The Charge of the Trial Court
The charge to the jury in cases involving felony murder is the last
155.

Although no case directly in point has been found in New York, there is a

dictum in People v. Marendi, 213 N.

Y. 600, 612, 101 N.

E. 1OSS, 1061 (1915)

which

seems to support this view.
156. Butler v. People, 125 I1. 641, 18 N. E. 33S (1888). Accord: Commonwealth v.
Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 88 S. W. 1035 (1905); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 89 Da-s. 541

(1863).
157. 254 N. Y. 255, 172 N. E. 489 (1930). See People v. Giro, 197 N. Y. 152, 153,
90 N. E. 432, 434 (1910) where the court goes to great lengths to show that the shots
killing the deceased were fired by the accused or his accomplice and not by one of the
other victims of the burglary.
158. Taylor v. State, 41 Tex. Cr. 564, 55 S. W. 961 (1900); Keaton v. State, 41
Tem. Cr. 621, 57 S. W. 1125 (1900); Wilson v. State, ISS Ark. 846, 63 S. W. (2d)

(1934).
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phase of the doctrine to be treated. This problem harasses the mind
of the law student perhaps more than any of those heretofore considered, perplexing as they are, and it has become a veritable incubus to
the trial judges themselves. Most of the reversals of felony murder
convictions in the Court of Appeals in recent years have been predicated
on the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury properly. 10 In
some instances the error consisted in charging merely felony murder
or acquittal,'160 in another it was error not to charge merely felony
murder or acquittal,' 61 and in still others it has been held prejudicial
to submit the felony murder theory to the jury at all. 02
Under an indictment for murder in the first degree, the trial court
usually may and does instruct the jury on the various degrees of murder
and manslaughter, authorizing it to bring in a verdict of guilty of any
one of these crimes or of acquittal. This was the practice at common
laW6 3 and authority for it today may be found in Section 610 of the

New York Penal Law which provides:
"Upon the trial of an indictment, the prisoner may be convicted of the crime
charged therein, or of a lesser degree of the same crime, or of an attempt
to commit the crime64so charged, or of an attempt to commit a lesser degree
of the same crime.'

159. People v. Hiter, 184 N. Y. 237, 77 N. E. 6 (1906); People v. Spohr, 206 N. Y.
516, 100 N. E. 444 (1912); People v. Marendi, 213 N. Y. 600, 107 N. E. 1058 (1915);
People v. Marwig, 227 N. Y. 382, 125 N. E. 535 (1919); People v. Smith, 232 N. Y.
239, 133 N. E. 574 (1921); People v. Van Norman, 231 N. Y. 454, 132 N. E. 147 (1921);
People v. Collins, 234 N. Y. 355, 137 N. E. 753 (1922); People v. Koeyber, 244 N. Y.
147, 155 N. E. 79 (1926); People v. Moran, 246 N. Y. 100, 158 N. E. 35 (1927); People
v. Martone, 256 N. Y. 395, 176 N. E. 544 (1931); People v. Roper, 259 N. Y. 170, 181
N. E. 88 (1932); People v. Walsh, 262 N. Y. 140, 186 N. E. 422 (1933); People V.
Lazar, 271 N. Y. 27, 2 N. E. (2d) 32 (1936).
160. People v. Van Norman, 231 N. Y. 454, 132 N. E. 147 (1921); People v. Smith,
232 N. Y. 239, 133 N. E. 574 (1921); People v. Koerber, 244 N. Y. 147, 155 N. E. 79
(1926); People v. Moran, 246 N. Y. 100, 158 N. E. 35 (1927); People v. Roper, 259

N. Y. 170, 181 N. E. 88 (1932); People v. Walsh, 262 N. Y. 140, 186 N. E. 422 (1933).
161. People v. Martone, 256 N. Y. 395, 176 N. E. 544 (1931).
162. People v. Hilter, People v. Spohr, People v. Marendi, People v. Lazar, (all cited
supra, note 159). Apparently the Court of Appeals has divided the cases into three
groups: (a) Where there is no question but that the homicide was during the commission of a felony and the Trial Judge is justified in limiting the jury to a felony murder
conviction or acquittal; (b) Where as a matter of law, no felony is being committed at
the time of the homicide; (c) Where there is a question of fact as to whether the homicide is during the commission of a felony. It is questionable, however, whether there
is any real distinction between (b) and (c) in the actual decisions, for in every case
where the court has held that it was error for the Trial Judge to limit the jury to felony
murder or acquittal, it would also have been error to submit the theory of felony murder to
the jury at all even if other theories of homicide were charged.
163. See People v. Schleiman, 197 N. Y. 383, 385, 90 N. E. 950, 951 (1910).
164. See also N. Y. CoDE CmRI. PROC. (1900) § 444.
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But where, as in felony murder, intent is no element of the crime of
murder in the first degree, the power to convict of a lesser degree of
felonious homicide which belongs to the jury in cases where the degree
depends upon the intent cannot properly be exercised.'0 5 And so sometimes it is proper for the court to limit the jury to only one of two verdicts, guilty of murder in the first degree or not guilty.'GG The cases
in which this may be done, however, are exceptional and exist only
where there are but two alternatives consistent with the evidence, namely, either the accused was in no way connected with the homicide, in
which case he should be acquitted, or, if he was so connected, the killing was during the commission of a felony in which case he was guilty
of murder in the first degree. 0 7 Where there exists any question of
fact as to the existence or continuance of the underlying felony at the
time of the homicide, it is reversible error to submit merely felony
murder and acquittal to the jury 6s for "Evidence uncertain in its implications must not be warped or strained to force a jury into the
dilemma of choosing between death and freedom."' 0 9 Moreover, if,
as a matter of law, an independent felony is not in existence at the
time of the homicide, as, for example, where the only felony in the case
is the fatal assault, then it is error to submit the theory of felony
murder to the jury at all, even if other theories of homicide are also
charged. 170 This is on the principle that if two or more theories of
guilt are charged and one of them is basically wrong, the appellate
court cannot speculate as to the theory upon which the verdict was
based, and a reversal is required.'
The failure of the trial judges to
recognize this after repeated warnings has caused the Court of Appeals
more than once to voice its impatience. 7 2 But while there are cases
in which it is admittedly difficult to understand the basis of the trial
165. People v. Schleiman, 197 N. Y. 383, 90 N. E. 960 (1910).
166. People v. Schleiman, 197 N. Y. 383, 90 N. E. 950 (1910); People v. Chapman,
224 N. Y. 463, 121 N. E. 381 (1918); People v. Seller, 246 N. Y. 262, 158 N. E. 246 (1927);
People v. Martone, 256 N. Y. 395, 176 N. E. 544 (1931).
167. See note 160, =upra.
168. People v. Koerber, 244 N. Y. 147, 155 N. E. 79 (1926); People v. Walh, 262
N. Y. 140, 1S6 N. E. 422 (1933).
169. People v. Moran, 246 N. Y. 100, 105, 158 N. E. 35, 37 (1927).
170. See note 162, supra.
171. See People v. Lazar, 271 N. Y. 27, 31, 2 N. E. (2d) 32, 35 (1936).
172. See People v. Moran, 246 N. Y. 100, 105, 158 N. E. 35, 37 (1927). "It is difficult
to understand why trial judges in criminal cases continue to make the setious error disclosed by the record in this case in view of the fact that it has been repeatedly pointed
out that such a charge absolutely requires a reversal of a conviction," People v. Lazar,
271 N. Y. 27, 29, 2 N. E. (2d) 32, 33 (1936).
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court's charge,'7 3 in others it would take a legal geomancer to instruct

the jury in a way of which the Court of Appeals would approve. Nice
distinctions such as were drawn in People v. Moran17 4 and border-

line cases in abandonment such as People v. Walsh7 5 would shake the
confidence of the most learned jurist in drawing his charge to the jury.
In fact, the confusion caused by some of the opinions has caused one
commentator to observe that the Court of Appeals has apparently
decided to reserve to itself the right to send any case back for a new
trial if it results in a way not pleasing to that court.17'
Would the difficulty be avoided if the trial judges were to charge the
other degrees of homicide in every felony murder case? Where, for instance, the homicide is clearly during the commission of a felony and
the issue resolves itself into the question of the defendant's participation in the crime, may the trial court charge both felony murder and
deliberate and premeditated murder? In some cases it may, and may
thus submit to the jury more than one possible theory of guilt.177 There
is nothing inconsistent with these two theories of guilt, ordinarily, for
although the statute says of felony murder "without design to kill" it
is obviously no less a felony murder if the felon killed with deliberation
and premeditatipn. 78 But there is one situation in which it would be
error for the court to charge anything other than the alternative ver-

dicts of first degree murder and acquittal. Such was the case .in People
v. Martone70 in which the accused was an alleged accomplice of the
173. For example, in People v. Lazar, 271 N. Y. 27, 2 N. E. (2d) 32 (1936), the jury
was instructed that it could find the defendarnt guilty of murder in the first degree even
though there was neither intent, deliberation nor premeditation, if it found that he shot
the deceased during the commission of a second degree assault on the deceased.
174. 246 N. Y. 100, 158 N. E. 35 (1927). There, it will be remembered, the court
held that the killing of the two officers was during the one indivisible assault which
merged in the homicides, distinguishing People v. Wagner. Discussed supra, note 38.
175. See note 141, supra.
176. Eisenberg, The Doctrine of Felony Murder in New York, N. Y. L. J., Jan. 18,
1935, p. 316.
177. Buel v. People, 78 N. Y. 492, (1879); People v. Sullivan, 173 N. Y. 122, 65 N. E.
989 (1903); People v. Wagner, 245 N. Y. 143, 156 N. E. 644 (1927).
178. Dolan v. People, 64 N. Y. 485 (1876); People v. Sullivan, 173 N. Y. 122, 65 N. E.
989 (1903). O'Brien, dissenting in the latter case said at 145: "If the proof tended to
show that the deceased was killed without any design to effect death, but while the
patties were engaged in an attempt to commit a felony, it necessarily excluded the theory
that he was killed from a deliberate and premeditated design. It would seem to follow
that the case should have been submitted to the jury on one theory or the other, and
not upon both." The force of this reasoning is not convincing for certainly a delberato
and premeditated killing duting the commission of a felony is just as much a felony murder
as an unintentional homicide.
179. 256 N. Y. 395, 176 N. E. 544 (1931), rev'g 232 App. Div. 681, 247 N. Y. Supp. 896
(2d Dep't 1931).
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one who had committed homicide during the commission of a felony.
The defendant appealed from a conviction of manslaughter contending
that he was either guilty of first degree murder or innocent, for if he
was an accomplice to the independent felony, he was guilty of murder
in the first degree and if he was not such an accomplice, he was guilty
of no crime at all. Novel as the defendant's contention may appear, it
is absolutely sound and the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction
of manslaughter. This decision places a trial judge in a very difficult
predicament when the defendant is an accomplice rather than the actual
slayer. To charge only felony murder or acquittal, it must be one of
the "exceptional" cases mentioned above, 6 0 and yet to charge anything
other than that leaves the door open for the accused to contend that
no other theory of guilt is consistent with the evidence.1 81
Conclusion
It is manifest that the doctrine of felony murder is in need of some
reformation in New York. But, while commentators are agreed that
the law, in its present state, is far from satisfactory, there is no such
unanimity either with respect to the particular phases of the doctrine
which require alteration or clarification, or as to the most effective
method of accomplishing it. To one author,182 the principle of holding
accomplices responsible for a felony murder committed by another is
especially objectionable. He would limit their liability to cases in
which the felony was of a dangerous character and in which there was
a foreseeable risk of danger to another, and he suggests that even in
such cases the rule should not always be applied. That it is a harsh
rule which renders a man subject to a charge of murder for an accidental homicide, not reasonably foreseeable, merely because he is engaged in the commission of an act defined by statute as felonious admits
of no argument. But it is difficult to see why it is any more inhuman
when applied to accomplices than when applied to cases where the
accused is the actual slayer. The doctrine should not be applied to
non-dangerous felonies in which the risk of death is not reasonably
180. See notes 160 and 167, supra.
181. The p~oblem is made the more difficult if the classification stated in note 162,
supra, is accepted. Suppose the accused was an accomplice of the actual haler and had
entered the conspiracy only on the express understanding that no force was to be used.
Suppose, further, that there was a question of fact whether the homicide was during
the commission of a felony or not. The accused is guilty on only one pos-sible theory,
to wit, as an accomplice to a felony murder, and yet, the trial judge may not limit the
jury to a felony murder conviction or acquittal if there is any question of fact concerning the existence of the underlying felony.
182. Eisenberg, The Doctrine of Felony Murder in New York, N. Y. L. J., Jan. 17,
1935, p. 296.
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foreseeable whether the defendant be the actual killer or merely his
accomplice. Suppose that the accused attempts to commit felonious
larceny of an automobile. As he starts the car, a spark from the
machine ignites some gasoline causing an explosion which kills a passerby. Would the accused be guilty of felony murder? Would there
be any stronger reason for holding him on such a charge than an accomplice who may have sat beside him? Or, assume that the defendant although ignorant of the fact, has a disease which he communicates
to a girl during the commission of second degree rape and she dies
from its effects. Should this be considered murder? The objection to
the present status of the New York doctrine goes deeper than the question of a confederate's responsibility.
Other authors,'8 3 while recognizing that the rule should not be extended beyond the felonies in which the risk of death is reasonably foreseeable, argue against resort to legislative aid and contend that the
remedy lies with the courts. It must be admitted that the courts could
accomplish far more by a sane application of the rationale of the doctrine than could the Legislature by amending the statute to enumerate
the felonies included in the rule. It has been pointed out, for instance,
that it is sometimes possible to have felonies which are ordinarily considered non-dangerous committed by violent means, thus rendering forseeable the risk of death, and that the so-called dangerous felonies may,
at times, be committed in such a way that the risk of death is not to
be expected.'
In the face of these arguments, however, stands the
fact that the Court of Appeals, except in a few instances where it
speaks of the liability of confederates in terms of foreseeability, has
given no indication that it intends to follow the lead of the present-day
English Courts. It is submitted that the more direct and effective way
to avoid the danger of a literal interpretation of the statute is not to
sit back and hope, but to change the statute to enumerate, as it once
did,'185 those felonies during the commission of which a homicide constitutes murder. This is suggested despite the realization that some
felony which should be included in the statute may be omitted, an example of which was presented by the Hauptmann case in New Jersey.
But this is a criticism not of the method, but of the laxity of the draftsmen, and a well considered and carefully drawn statute would be preferable to the present uncertainty concerning the future decisions of
the Court of Appeals on this problem. Moreover, the possibility of
one criminal escaping through a negligent omission in the statute would
183. Arent and MacDonald, The Felony Murder Doctrine and Its Application Under
the New York Statute (1935) 20 CoRN. L. Q. 288.
184. Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought (1934) 43 YAL, L. J. 537.
185. N. Y. Laws 1860, c. 410, § 2.
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be more than counterbalanced by the elimination of the danger of sending a man to his death for an unintended, non-negligent, non-foreseeable
homicide merely because the act in which he was engaged at the time
is defined by statute as a felony.
Another phase of the doctrine which calls for attention is the rule
governing homicides during the course of escape from the scene of a
felony. To change this rule, resort must be had to a legislative enactment, for the Court of Appeals has taken the position that a homicide
during the course of flight is not felony murder under the present
statute. An amendment was recently introduced in the Legislature s0
to provide that a homicide during an escape or attempted escape from
a felony be classified as felony murder, but it was not passed.
Perhaps the strongest objection to such an amendment is the difficulty of defining accurately just what is meant by escape from a felony.
A man may be escaping from the commission of a felony for hours,
even days after the felony has ended, and under such a provision in
the statute a man might be convicted of felony murder for a homicide
committed long after the original felony has ended. But this objection
loses much of its force if the suggested amendment is revised to read,
or construed by the courts to mean homicides committed "in furtherance
of an escape from or attempted escape from the commission of or attempted felony," and is limited to cases of fresh pursuit where the
1 T
interval of time between the felony and the homicide is not too great. 1
It is submitted that some such statutory change is warranted. Human
experience teaches us that perhaps the time most fraught with danger
in the commission of such crimes as robbery and burglary comes at
186. (February 12, 1936) No. 1180. The proposed amendment reads as follows:
. . or without a design to effect death, by a person engaged in the commLsA-on of,
or in an attempt to commit a felony, either upon or affecting the person killed or otherwise, or in the escape from or attempted escape from such commission of or attempted
felony."
187. The following cases from other jurisdictions in which a homicide during flight
from a felony is felony murder are of interest: Commonwealth v. Doris, 287 Pa. 547,
135 AtI. 313 (1926) (holding the accused guilty of a felony murder although the homicide was committed, after the accused had been arrested, by one of his confederates);
State v. Terrell, 175 La. 758, 144 So. 488 (1932) (where the homicide was committed
several blocks from the scene of the felony); State v. Daniels, 119 Wash. 557, 205 Pac.
1054 (1922). In the Daniels case, the defendants had stolen a car. The following morning they shot and killed a policeman who accosted them six miles from the scene of
the larceny. Larceny was specifically included in the felony murder statute in that state,
and the Court reached the extreme decision that the defendants could be found guilty of
felony murder despite the lapse of time between the theft of the car and the homicide on the
grounds (a) that there was a question of fact for the jury whether the felony had been
completed, and (b) larceny is a continuing crime.
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the moment when the felon is threatened with capture or arrest and
is making good his escape. If the doctrine of felony murder is to
remain in our law, such homicides should be brought within the scope
of the doctrine, for they are clearly within its spirit.

